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We consider one of the quantum key distribution protocols recently introduced in Ref. [Pirandola
et al., Nature Physics 4, 726 (2008)]. This protocol consists in a two-way quantum communication
between Alice and Bob, where Alice encodes secret information via a random phase-space displace-
ment of a coherent state. In particular, we study its security against a specific class of individual
attacks which are based on combinations of Gaussian quantum cloning machines.
INTRODUCTION
Recently [1, 2], we have shown how two-way quantum
communication can profitably be exploited to enhance
the security of continuous variable quantum key distri-
bution [3, 4, 5, 6]. In particular, we have investigated the
security of two-way protocols in the presence of collective
Gaussian attacks which are modelled by combinations of
entangling cloners [5]. Even though this situation is the
most important one from the point view of the practical
implementation, the effect of other kind of Gaussian at-
tacks (i.e., not referable to entangling cloners) must also
be analyzed. In this paper, we study the security of the
two-way coherent-state protocol of Ref. [1] against in-
dividual attacks where an eavesdropper (Eve) combines
two different Gaussian quantum cloning machines (also
called Gaussian cloners). In particular, we are able to
show the robustness of the two-way protocol when the
first cloner is fixed to be symmetric in the output clones.
This symmetry condition enables us to derive the results
quite easily but clearly restricts our security analysis to
a preliminary stage. For this reason, the optimal per-
formance of Gaussian cloners against two-way quantum
cryptography is still unknown at the present stage.
ADDITIVE GAUSSIAN CHANNELS AND
GAUSSIAN CLONERS
Consider a stochastic variable X with values x ∈ R
distributed according to a Gaussian probability
GΣ2(x) =
1√
2piΣ2
exp
[
− x
2
2Σ2
]
, (1)
with variance Σ2. This variable is taken as input of a
classical channel that outputs another stochastic variable
Y with values y ∈ R. In particular, the classical channel
is called additive Gaussian channel if, for every input
x, the conditional output y|x is Gaussianly distributed
around x with some variance σ2 [7]. As a consequence,
the output variable Y is a Gaussian variable with zero
mean and variance Σ2 + σ2. According to Shannon’s
theory [8], the classical correlations between the input
and output variables lead to a mutual information
I(X,Y ) =
1
2
log(1 + γ) , (2)
where γ ≡ Σ2/σ2 is the signal to noise ratio (SNR). This
formula gives the maximal number of bits per Gaussian
value that can be sent through a Gaussian channel with
a given SNR (on average and asymptotically).
In quantum information theory, an example of addi-
tive Gaussian channel is provided by the Gaussian quan-
tum cloning machine (GQCM) [9]. Consider a continuous
variable (CV) system, like a bosonic mode, which is de-
scribed by a pair of conjugate quadratures xˆ and pˆ, with
[xˆ, pˆ] = i, acting on a Hilbert space H. Then, consider a
coherent state |ϕ〉 with amplitude ϕ = (x + ip)/√2. A
1 → 2 GQCM is a completely-positive trace-preserving
linear map
M : |ϕ〉〈ϕ| → ρ12 ∈ D(H⊗2) , (3)
such that the single clone states, ρ1 = tr2(ρ12) and ρ2 =
tr1(ρ12), are given by a Gaussian phase-space modulation
of the input state |ϕ〉〈ϕ|, i.e.,
ρk =
∫
dµΩσ2
k
(µ)Dˆ(µ)|ϕ〉〈ϕ|Dˆ†(µ) , k = 1, 2, (4)
where
Ωσ2
k
(µ) ≡ 1
piσ2k
exp
[
−|µ|
2
σ2k
]
, (5)
and
Dˆ(µ) = exp(µaˆ† − µ∗aˆ) . (6)
In Eq. (5), the quantities σ2k are the error variances in-
duced by the cloning process on both the x and p quadra-
tures of the k-th clone. Notice that here we consider a
2GQCM which clones symmetrically in the quadratures
(in general, one can have a Gaussian cloner which is
asymmetric both in the clones and the quadratures, with
four different noise variances σ21,x, σ
2
1,p, σ
2
2,x and σ
2
2,p.)
The previous variances do not depend on the input state
(universal GQCM) and satisfy the relation
σ21σ
2
2 ≥ 1/4 , (7)
imposed by the uncertainty principle. In particular, the
previous GQCM is said to be optimal if σ21σ
2
2 = 1/4. In
terms of Shannon’s theory, each of the two real variables,
x and p, is subject to an additive Gaussian channel with
noise equal to σ2k during the cloning process from the
input state to the output k-th clone.
TWO-WAY COHERENT-STATE PROTOCOL
The protocol is sketched in Fig.1 and consists of two
configurations, ON and OFF, that can be selected by
Alice with probabilities 1− c and c respectively.
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FIG. 1: Two-way coherent-state protocol in both the ON and
OFF configurations.
Let Bob prepare a reference coherent state |β〉〈β|, with
amplitude β randomly chosen in the complex plane (e.g.,
according to a Gaussian distribution with a large vari-
ance). Such a state is sent to Alice on the forward use
of the quantum channel. In the ON configuration, Alice
encodes a signal on this reference state via a phase-space
displacement Dˆ(α) whose amplitude α ≡ (xA+ ipA)/
√
2
is chosen in the C-plane according to a random Gaussian
distribution ΩΣ2(α) with large variance Σ
2. Notice that
(i) The signal amplitude α symmetrically encodes two
signal quadratures, xA and pA, i.e., two indepen-
dent and real random variables distributed ac-
cording to Gaussian distributions GΣ2(xA) and
GΣ2(pA).
(ii) The output state
Dˆ(α)|β〉〈β|Dˆ†(α) = |α+ β〉〈α+ β| , (8)
encodes the signal amplitude α, masked by the ref-
erence amplitude β chosen by Bob.
The state is finally sent back to Bob, who tries to guess
the two Alice’s numbers xA and pA by a joint measure-
ment of conjugate observables [10]. This is accomplished
by a heterodyne detection [11] of the state, which will
give an outcome ζ ≈ α+ β. After the subtraction of the
known value β, Bob achieves an estimate α′ of Alice’s
complex amplitude α, i.e., x′A ≈ xA and p′A ≈ pA.
In the case of a noiseless channel between Alice and
Bob, the only noise in all the process is introduced by the
heterodyne detection. This measurement can be seen as
a further Gaussian additive channel at Bob’s site, which
gives a Gaussian noise equal to 1 for each quadrature.
Thus, according to Shannon’s formula, we have
IAB = I(xA, x
′
A) + I(pA, p
′
A) = log(1 + γAB) , (9)
with γAB = Σ
2/1.
Let us now consider a noisy channel adding Gaussian
noise with variances σ2 (in the forward path) and σ
′2 (in
the backward path) for each quadrature. Then, the total
noise of the channel is σ2ch = σ
2+σ
′2 and the total noise
which Bob tests, after detection, is equal to σ2B = σ
2
ch+1,
giving a SNR γAB = Σ
2/σ2B. In the OFF configuration,
Alice and Bob estimate the noise in the channel by per-
forming two heterodyne detections. After receiving the
reference state, Alice simply heterodynes it with outcome
β′ and then reconstructs a coherent state |ϑ〉. This state
is sent to Bob, who gets the outcome ζ ≈ ϑ after detec-
tion. In this way, Alice and Bob collect the pairs {β, β′}
and {ϑ, ζ} from which they can estimate the two noises
σ2 and σ′2 of the channel via public communications.
Notice that here we are using the ON configuration to
encode the key and the OFF configuration to check the
noise of the channel. This means that we are implicitly
assuming that Eve’s attack is disjoint between the two
paths of the quantum communication (i.e., Eve is using
two distinct one-mode GQCMs). More generally, in or-
der to exclude joint attacks between the two paths, the
ON and OFF configurations must be used symmetrically
for encoding and checking [1].
EAVESDROPPING VIA GAUSSIAN CLONERS
In the previous two-way quantum communication, the
choices of the reference β and the signal α are two inde-
pendent processes. As a consequence, Eve has to extract
information on both the reference β and the total dis-
placement α + β in order to access Alice’s encoding α
(this is true until the attack is disjoint). Let us consider
two different attacks, one on the forward use of the chan-
nel and the other one in the backward use, by using two
optimal GQCMs which we call M and M ′, respectively
(see Fig. 1).
3Since the reference β and the signal α are chosen with
large variances, such machines must be universal, and
since the information is symmetrically encoded in the two
quadratures, we consider equal cloning noises in x and p.
For these reasons, Eve’s GQCMs are exactly of the kind
specified by Eq. (4) with σ21σ
2
2 = 1/4. After cloning, Eve
must extract the information about α from her clones.
She can directly heterodyne the clones. Alernatively, she
can send the clones to a beam-splitter (BS), with suitable
reflection and transmission coefficients r and t, and then
heterodynes the output ports.
In order to study the eavesdropping depicted in Fig. 1,
it is not sufficient to consider the reduced states ρk of
the two single clones at the output of M , but we have to
compute explicitly the whole bipartite state ρ12 of modes
1 and 2. In fact, mode 1 is sent to Alice (who displaces
it) and then cloned by M ′ into the output modes 1′ and
2′. The second mode 2′ then interferes with the previous
mode 2 on the beam-splitter. For this reason, we have to
keep all the correlations between the various modes till
the interference process. One can prove that the bipartite
state ρ12 at the output of the optimal GQCM M is a
Gaussian state with correlation matrix (CM) equal to
V =
1
2
(
(1 + 2σ2)I I
I (1 + 1/2σ2)I
)
, (10)
where I is the 2× 2 identity matrix. The CM of Eq. (10)
has positive partial transpose for every σ2 ≥ 0, and,
therefore, ρ12 is always a separable state [12]. This means
that Eve cannot exploit strategies based on the entangle-
ment between her clones and the ones of Alice and Bob.
In the particular case of symmetric cloning (σ2 = 1/2),
we can write the useful decomposition
ρ12 =
∫
d2µ Ω1/2(µ)×
|β + µ〉1〈β + µ| ⊗ |β + µ〉2〈β + µ| . (11)
Then, let us consider the case where the first cloner M
is optimal and symmetric (σ21 = σ
2
2 = 1/2), while the
second cloner M ′ is optimal but asymmetric, with σ21′ ≡
ω2 and σ22′ = 1/4ω
2. In this case, at the output modes
+ and − of the BS, we have the bipartite state
ρ+− =
∫
d2µ Ω1/2(µ) χ(µ) (12)
where
χ(µ) ≡
∫
d2λ Ω1/4ω2(λ)×
|θ+ + λr〉+〈θ+ + λr| ⊗ |θ− + λt〉−〈θ− + λt| , (13)
and
θ+ ≡ (µ+β)(t+ r)+αr, θ− ≡ (µ+β)(t− r)+αt . (14)
If we now take a balanced BS (i.e., t = r = 1/
√
2) we have
θ− ≡ α/
√
2 and, therefore, the output port − does no
longer contain the reference β. Here, the action of the BS
is very similar to the sum(mod2) performed over a binary
key (k) and the corresponding encrypted message (k⊕m),
operation that reveals the message in the classical case
(k ⊕m ⊕ k = m). On the other hand, the other port +
still contains a mixing between α and β and, therefore,
does not provide further information about the signal.
Tracing out this port, we have
ρ− =
∫
d2λ Ω1/4ω2(λ) |(α + λ)/
√
2〉−〈(α+ λ)/
√
2| .
(15)
Heterodyning such a state, Eve can estimate the value of
α up to a Gaussian noise with variance
σ2E = 2 + (4ω
2)−1 , (16)
for each quadrature. For Bob, instead, we have a total
noise
σ2B = 1 + σ
2
ch , (17)
equal to the sum of the heterodyne noise (1) and the total
channel noise
σ2ch = 1/2 + ω
2 . (18)
According to Shannon, Bob (B) and Eve (E) will share
with Alice (A) a mutual information equal to IAX =
log(1 + γAX) with γAX ≡ Σ2/σ2X for X = B,E. Since
[13]
IAB ≥ IAE ⇐⇒ γAB ≥ γAE ⇐⇒ σ2B ≤ σ2E , (19)
we can easily compute a security threshold for this kind
of attack, which is equal to
σ˜2ch = (3 +
√
5)/4 ≃ 1.3 . (20)
Such a threshold must be compared with the security
threshold (0.5) which characterizes one-way coherent-
state protocols [5, 6] against individual GQCM attacks.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have considered one of the two-way
protocols introduced in [1]. Then, we have explicitly
studied its security in the presence of particular kind
of individual attacks which are based on combinations
of one-mode Gaussian cloners. Our analysis indicates
that the superadditive behavior of the security threshold
should also hold against this kind of Gaussian attacks.
However, our analysis is far to be complete since we
have considered only particular combinations of cloners
and we have also excluded the possibility of a two-mode
cloner (acting coherently on both the paths of the quan-
tum communication). Furthermore, the analysis covers
the case of direct reconciliation only. Despite these re-
strictions, the present work represents the first step in
the security analysis of two-way protocols against more
exotic kind of Gaussian interactions.
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